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The World War II Experience 
and the Leadership of Entrepreneurship and Venture Investing 
around Stanford University 
Dr. Frederick Terman 1 has been widely recognized as the "godfather of 
Silicon Valley" (Lowood, 1982). Terman, a Stanford University electrical 
engineering professor, managed Harvard University's Radio Research Laboratory 
during World War II and returned as Stanford's dean of engineering. His 
commitment to seeing California companies in science-based industries seize 
postwar opportunities to push ahead of their Eastern counterparts influenced 
the venture investing as well as the entrepreneurship that built a thriving 
high-technology industrial community around Stanford University. Terman's 
wartime experience shaped his postwar role as a leader of high-technology 
entrepreneurship. Wartime experiences similarly influenced individuals who 
invested in California ventures after the war. Environmental shifts during 
World War II also did much to foster the industrial community now known as 
Silicon Valley. 
Post-War Opportunities for Technology Ventures in California 
During World War II, the American West changed from almost an economic 
colony of the East into a region with a rapidly growing diversified economy. 
The development of service industries and advanced technology industries, 
particularly aerospace and electronics, in the West shot far ahead of their 
development in the East (Nash, 1985, pp. 3-36). 
Wartime demographic shifts favored postwar entrepreneurship and venture 
investing in the West. Many veterans hoped to start businesses, and many of 
1 Terman died in 1982 at age 82. 
the 800,000 veterans returning to California were expected to stay (Wendt, 
1946, p. 9; Wendt, 1947, p. 43; Nash, 1985, pp. 37-41). Western population 
growth strengthened the marketing base for West Coast firms (Terman, 1947a, 
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pp. 10-14). Per-capita savings grew more in the West than in the East (Monroe, 
1946). 
World War II accelerated the rise of scientific research in the West. 
In 1944, scientist Bernard Jaffe observed that "the center of gravity of 
scientific talent in the United States" had started to move west by the 1930s 
(Jaffe, 1944, p. 476). However, war mobilization brought in a vastly larger 
share of federal research funds--partly because war planners' decentralization 
strategy overrode traditional allocation methods that used advisory groups 
dominated by Eastern scientists (Nash, 1985, pp. 153-160) . There was a sense 
that Western science was gaining influence--notably with the rise of Ernest 
0. Lawrence's radiation laboratory at the University of California, Berkeley, 
as well as science and engineering research at Stanford University and the 
California Institute of Technology. This sense of rising expectations made 
Western financiers less likely than Eastern financiers to grow skeptical 
about technology ventures' prospects and turn back to conventional ventures 
when the war ended. 
There were many signs that federal money and federal planning had 
stimulated the West's wartime growth. About 90 percent of the investment 
capital that the West gained during the war was federal money (Nash, 1973, 
p. 49; Nash, 1985, pp. 17-36). Many government offices opened in San Francisco 
during the war; by the end of the war, only Washington, D.C . , had more (Monroe, 
1946, p. 52). West Coast financiers were less prone than Eastern financiers 
to feel threatened by state capitalism. Because of the West's wartime economic 
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advances, West Coast leaders were not worried about reversing industrial 
decline, as Eastern financiers were. Yet regional pride influenced the growth 
of venture investirig on the West Coast as much as it did in the Northeast, 
where the promotion of venture investing was in part a response to industrial 
decline. Public and private leaders in California spoke, usually confidently, 
of the need to build on the wartime boost to industrial development. Many 
small businesses had closed and few had started during the war. The state's 
shipping and aircraft industries, which had grown rapidly during the war, 
declined just as rapidly after the war. Yet California policy makers had 
optimistic postwar scenarios. 
California leaders sensed that the future of their state was tied to 
the future of small business, which traditionally had a strong role in the 
state economy. When San Fra~cisco financier Edward Heller was nominated to 
the U.S. Surplus Property Board in 1944, California Attorney General Robert 
Kenny praised the board's mission to support small business and testified that 
Heller shared that mission. "It is particularly important in our region 
where we are growing, where we have not established industries , " Kenny said. 
"We are particularly anxious to see carried out those phases of the bill 
which will prevent the disposition of surpluses from going to build up existing 
monopolies . . " (Kenny, 1944, p. 127). California policy makers were 
very conscious that the aftermath of the war could favor entrepreneurship in 
their state, according to Paul Wendt of the University of California at 
Berkeley's business school, who analyzed small businesses' financial prospects 
for the California Reconstruction and Reemployment Commission. State officials 
wanted to create "optimum conditions" for new businesses to form and operate 
profitably. Legislators even proposed a California Reconversion Finance 
Corporation modelled loosely on the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 
January 1946, although nothing came of this idea (Wendt, 1946, p. 9; Wendt, 
1947, p. 43). 
Continued federal support in the years just after World War II did much 
to foster the development of high-technology industry and new technology 
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firms on the West Coast. In a November 1953 letter to Harold Laun, chairman 
of Television Shares Management Co., a mutual fund that Terman advised, Terman 
wrote that the end to increases in federal research and development funding 
"means that the lush period for starting new enterprises and learning to 
operate at government expense is over" (Terman, 1953). Terman referred to 
several key high-technology firms as "war babies" (Terman, 1954). 
Post-War Venture Investing 
On the West Coast, the innovation of organizing venture investing after 
World War II was only vaguely conscious--incremental and largely a response 
to venture investment opportunities more well defined and more abundant than 
those in the rest of the nation. Eastern pioneers in organized venture 
investing were implementing prewar proposals for institutional venture investing 
but building in features of traditional, personal venture investing. Western 
innovators, in contrast, revived traditional, individual venture investing 
but applied evaluation and monitoring techniques that institutional investors 
had developed. 
West Coast financiers, unlike Eastern financiers, were relatively free 
of anxiety about postwar "reconversion" to a peacetime economy and unconcerned 
with proving the legitimacy of private capitalism. Yet the innovation of 
organized venture investing followed from the war experience in the West, as 
it did in the East. Because the wartime shift of industry, population, and 
scientific research to the West advanced postwar opportunities for 
entrepreneurship, the enthusiasm about venture opportunities that arose just 
after the war was sustained on the West Coast much more than in the East 
(Griswold, 1950, pp. 599, 601; Fortune, 1950; Nash, 1973, pp. 48-53). 
Despite the widespread awareness of outstanding postwar venture 
opportunities on the West Coast, most conventional financing sources were 
reluctant to deal with new ventures. Thirteen California investment banks 
surveyed in 1946 received 200 inquiries ~nr securities issues of less than 
$200,000 thgt year. They turned down 185 (because they were too venturesome, 
had inexperienced managers, or offered too little profit). They had financed 
five proposals and were still thinking about the remaining ten (Wendt, 1947, 
pp. 47-48). 
In contrast, private investors were very interested in new ventures. 
Individuals associated with the ventures sold 63 of the 70 securities issues 
of less than $300,000 for which notification letters were filed with the 
SEC; investment bankers underwrote the remaining seven. A dramatic increase 
in requests for permits from California's Commissioner of Corporations in 
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1946 also signalled a resurgence in local venture investing. Some reorganized 
their businesses as corporations because the federal excess profits tax on 
corporations was repealed, but many others formed new ventures and planned 
to sell stock within California (Wendt, 1946, p. 150; Wendt, 1947, pp. 48-49). 
There were trends toward organization even in the revival of 
individualistic venture investing. At least two formal venture capital 
organizations formed in California in 1946. 
A group of California and Eastern investors organized the Industrial 
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Capital Corporation with $1 million in capital by June 1946. Their mission 
statement expressed the financial community's widespread desire to strengthen 
private capital, but it did not show the anxiety that Eastern financiers 
expressed. The "general objective" was "assisting the development of business 
on the West Coast by private financing." The organizers highlighted the 
special opportunities in "the expansion of industry and commerce on the Pacific 
Coast . " As many did after the war , the organizers pointed to a gap in the 
existing institutions' arrangements for financing ventures , but they reassured 
the local financial community that their intent was to complement, not to 
displace . Industrial Capital Corp . would finance small and medium-sized 
businesses, with direct loans, debt purchases, equity purchases , or a 
combination of these methods . Its organizers would support as well as finance 
these businesses--"to act as financial and industrial counselors to 
management . " However, they expressed little commitment to the i deal of 
independent venturing. Their organization was "equipped to negotiate 
consolidations or mergers, as well as participate in the outright acquisition 
of comr'l.nies." They hinted to acquiring corporations when they added, "While 
in general the corporation proposes to act as a principal, it may also act 
as an agent on occasion. .. " (Business Week, 1945, p. 22; Wendt, 1946, pp. 
140-41; San Francisco Chronicle, 1946, 1947; History of the Greater San 
Francisco Bay Region, 1966). 
A group of West Coast investors organized Pacific Coast Enterprises in 
San Francisco with $2 million in capital before October 1946. This organization 
had a mission more focused than Industrial Capital Corp.'s ; it would invest 
in small and new businesses in California . The directors--George Folsom, Louis 
Muller , Philip A. Fisher , Jacques Bergues , and Edward Hellman Heller--had 
been involved in the "private financing" of California ventures for several 
years. Heller, for example, began to work with Lockheed in the 1930s, and 
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he invested in Aircraft Accessories Corporation, a radar, radio, and hydraulics 
company that Randolph Walker, a Lockheed founder, organized the day that 
Pearl Harbor was bombed. Still, the founders were courageous to focus on 
small and new businesses, since their past success was not primarily with 
start-ups (Heller, 1944, p. 50; Walker, 1944, pp. 59-64; San Francisco 
Chronicle, 1945a , 1945b; Wendt, 1946, .pp . 141; San Francisco News, 1946, p. 
22; Fisher, 1957; San Francisco Chronicle, 1961; Johnson, 1984) . 
The two organizations' venture investing followed from wartime procurement. 
Marshall Kempner, president of Industrial Capital Corp., and Heller of Pacific 
Coast Enterprises had arranged financing for new military supply ventures 
while they served as military liaison officers with Federal Reserve banks--
Kempner in San Francisco, Heller in Boston. Howse, an Industrial Capital 
Corp. director, had been an Army Air Force procurement officer and then 
administrator of the Surplus Property Board, which oversaw the transfer of 
government military production facilities to private industry. Heller served 
on the Surplus Property Board (San Francisco Chronicle, 1945b, 1946, 1947, 
1961; Business Week, 1945). San Francisco, which had become a Western center 
for federal offices during the war, was a well-situated venture investing 
center in the era that began with reconversion and advanced when the Korean 
War and the Cold War brought contracts for sophisticated weapons. 
These two organizations were clusters of individual venture investors 
rather than staffed venture capital management organizations like American 
Research and Development Corp., which was organized in Boston in 1946. Many 
founders of the two California organizations continued to play important 
10 
roles as individual venture investors. 
Conditions were ripe for venture investing to grow after World War II, 
according to Henry A. McMicking, who with his brother Joseph formed McMicking 
& Co., one of the first San Francisco venture capital organizations, in 1947. 
"The country had gone through a tremendous depression and a tremendous war," 
McMicking said . "Nothing had been done. Youth were corning out of the war. 
We were all patriotic and interested in doing things. . . We were shocked 
about the German scientific things like the magnetophone" McMicking, educated 
at Stanford, initially worked as a stockbroker after serving as a combat 
intelligence officer in the war. McMicking & Co. financed the growth of 
Ampex Corp . , one of the first big successes in the 1950s high-technology 
stock boom (McMicking, 1987). Ampex's success in the public stock markets 
did much to encourage others to invest in new high-technology ventures. 
The West Coast innovators did less to differentiate venture capital 
from conventional business finance by forming organizations than their Eastern 
counterparts did. They tended to do venture investing as individuals and 
often as a sideline to other work in the financial community. However, they 
did much to develop a distinctive style of venture investing--closely engaged, 
emphasizing people in evaluation, mutualistic. 
Terrnan's Influence 
Incremental and individual action at Stanford did at least as much to 
develop venture investing as did MIT and Harvard's efforts to create a venture 
capital institution by organizing American Research and Development Corp. in 
1946 . Stanford administrators did not work with leaders of San Francisco's 
financial community to create a specialized venture capital organization, as 
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the Boston area university administrators did. However, Stanford administrators 
were early activists in the struggle to change institutional investment 
guidelines that constrained venture investing. They also built institutions 
that would support the growth of technology firms in the surrounding community. 
In 1946 they created Stanford Research Institute, a comprehensive research 
organization . They developed sites for technology businesses on university 
land. They developed intellectual property policies that encouraged faculty 
to develop commercial applications for their research (Lowood, 1982; Adams, 
1987) . 
The greatest stimulus to venture investing to come from Stanford was 
the personal involvement of Terman . Terman did much to develop the culture 
of the entrepreneur around Stanford University. This culture encouraged 
technology venturing and venture investing. Terman's ideas about personality, 
groups, and research management shaped the practices of both technology 
ventures and venture capital organizations. Terman also encouraged the growth 
of venture investing more directly. He advocated venture investing in speeches 
to many local organizations and referred technology venture founders to venture 
investors. Terman did not form a venture capital organization. Yet he became 
involved at the border of institutional finance and venture investing when 
he joined the technical advisory board of the Television Fund, a Chicago 
investment company, when it was organized in 1948 to invest in the emerging 
electronics industry. 
When he returned to Stanford after World War II, Terman began to argue 
that California electronics companies should plan to advance relative to 
those in the East, although he acknowledged that it would not be easy . By 
the time Terman spoke at the West Coast Institute of Radio Engineers convention 
in September 1947, he was consistently promoting a strategy to achieve this 
goal. There was "a group of sound electronic industries in the west . 
[a] nucleus on which to build for the future," Terman argued. He proposed a 
growth strategy focused on research rather than manufacturing strength. 
Eastern firms had the advantage when it came to mass production, but 
researchers liked California's climate and living environment. To implement 
this strategy, California firms needed to support basic research and pay 
competitive salaries (Terman , 1947a) . 
12 
The experience of managing the Radio Research Laboratory during World 
War II had a dramatic influence on Terman's life . It gave him an exhilarating 
sense of accomplishment and new insights about managing research . He believed 
that the war experience would have a similarly dramatic influence on other 
lives and on trends in science and industry. 
By acting on the assumption that the war experience would have a great, 
lasting influence, Terman reinforced this influence. He drew upon his 
experience managing wartime research to analyze postwar business and research 
strategies. With his postwar speeches, by evoking memories of the wartime 
sense of purpose, Terman motivated further achievements in technology. In 
the speeches he also perpetuated wartime enthusiasm about the promise of 
technology, which increased support for basic research and built financial 
and market support for technology ventures (Terman, 1946b, 1947b, 1952a) . 
Terman's war experience managing the Radio Research Laboratory was an 
idyllic equivalent of entrepreneurship. He faced little financial or 
bureaucratic control . "If in war a device becomes genuinely useful, then 
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the cost of development is of no significance and time is everything," he 
reflected in a 1946 speech to the National Association of Broadcasters. There 
was "(n]o one to check our results with" and "[n]o one to say that when we 
got our results they would be wanted," Terman said. "We just went ahead" 
(Terman, 1946a). 
The culture of entrepreneurship that Terman promoted was focused on 
young entrepreneurs. Many public and private leaders were stressing the 
need to help young people achieve their potential after the war. When business 
leaders and public officials in their speeches worried about the younger 
generation's prospects for achievement, their main concerns were often with 
increasing industrial productivity, easing progressive taxation, and keeping 
returning veterans from growing restive. In contrast, Terman was concerned 
about the implications of a life cycle effect in research contributions. In 
his notes for one of many speeches that proposed bringing talented young people 
to the fore of research rather than constraining them in hierarchies, Terman 
cited studies showing that researchers were at their highest potential between 
the ages of 25 and 35, although he marked this passage "out" (Terman, 1946b). 
Terman encouraged a mutualistic culture of entrepreneurship. He influenced 
not only the quantity and the quality of technology ventures but the mutuality 
of venturing in the area, according to venture capitalist William K. Bowes, 
now general partner of U.S. Venture Partners in Menlo Park. "Terman graduated 
Dave Packard and Bill Hewlett, saw what they gave back, and wanted to see that 
cycle repeat itself," said Bowes (Bowes, 1987). Terman's war experience 
also influenced this mutuality. A critical part of the war experience, Terman 
often reflected, was the extensive pooling of know-how for new manufacturing 
developments encouraged by the wartime values (Terman, 1946a). In the early 
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1950s, Terman observed that one lesson in the entrepreneurial process of 
the Bay Area electronics industry was that "mutual aid" as well as the ripple 
effect of creative pioneering activity was beneficial (Terman, 1952b). 
Terman's beliefs about personality have been reflected in venture 
capitalists' approaches to evaluating deals. His beliefs in turn were likely 
influenced by his family background. He was the son of Lewis Terman, a Stanford 
education professor who developed the Stanford Binet personality test and 
devoted most of his career to studying individual giftedness and leadership 
(Lowood, 1982). An individual's personality traits were strong indicators 
of potential to succeed in research or entrepreneurship, in Terman's view. 
The character analysis in Terman's letters prefigures the personality analysis 
that venture capital organizations have used to evaluate entrepreneurs seeking 
financing. It is also possible that Terman influenced the conventional wisdom 
that a venture seeking financing should have an effective group, not simply 
one potentially great entrepreneur. The idea that groups are critical for 
developing technology appears in his writings. Terman believed that creative 
researchers must be monitored respectfully rather than meticulously (Terman, 
195 )a). Similarly, venture capitalists acknowledge that it is important to 
monitor a venture without alienating the entrepreneurs whose specialized 
knowledge often is the venture's most important asset. Venture capitalists 
could have developed these operating assumptions independently by trial and 
error. However, Terman dealt frequently with several who became key figures 
in the venture capital industry, · and he expressed these ideas in public speeches 
that reached a wider group of venture investors. 
The exhilarating experience of pushing technological developments during 
the war crisis changed Terman's ideas about settings in which researchers 
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could flourish. Before and during his service at the Radio Research Laboratory, 
Terman often encouraged promising engineers and scientists to stay in 
university research rather than move into industry. After he returned to 
Stanford, he was more encouraging to engineers and scientists who thought 
about starting ventures. He advised entrepreneurs about financial strategy 
(Llewelling, 1949), and he introduced them to investors (Dennis, 1987; 
McMicking, 1987) and established companies (Terman, 1949c). 
Terman encouraged potential venture investors as well as potential 
entrepreneurs. He spoke about growth opportunities in the electronics industry 
to organizations like the Chambers of Commerce on the Peninsula, the Kiwanis 
Club, the Stanford Alumni, the Bond Club, and even the Bohemian Club, as 
well as to technical organizations like the Institute of Radio Engineers and 
the West Coast Electronics Manufacturers Association. By 1949, Terman included 
an industry analysis that highlighted the favorable opportunities for new, 
independent electronics ventures when he subtly promoted investment in local 
electronics firms (Terman, 1949b). The "[r]apid[ly] moving" electronics 
industry was "[s]o diverse that [there] cannot be monop[oly] ," Terman told 
members of the Bohemian Club in 1951. Individuals could build highly profitable 
companies with very little start-up capital, he said (Terman, 1951b). In 
his entertaining talks about electronics discoveries and applications, Terman 
appealed for support if basic research generally and the proposed National 
Research Foundation and Stanford University's programs specifically (Terman, 
1947a). Terman's speeches often had an explicit message that supporting 
engineering and science at Stanford combined civic duty and self-interest 
and an underlying message that investing in the young local companies developing 
new technologies did the same (Terman, 1949a). 
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Terman believed that there was a delicate balance between financing 
that promoted ventures' growth and financing that destroyed their independence 
and diverted them from their goals. A recurrent theme in his speeches during 
the late 1940s and early 1950s was the "very significant lesson" to be learned 
from the "checkered" history of Federal Telegraph Company, which operated 
in Palo Alto until it moved to New Jersey in 1931. Terman had worked for 
Federal one summer . Cyril Elwell, a Stanford graduate, bought patent rights 
for the Poulsen arc, raised money, and with help from San Francisco financier 
Beach Tho~n~on organized Federal Telegraph to develop continuous wave radio 
transmission. The company provided wireless telephone service for the Navy 
during World War I (Terman, 1949d, 1951a; Norberg, 1976). 
Part of the Federal Telegraph lesson was an inspiration for 
entrepreneurship. Although Federal Telegraph "left [the] West," it "left 
behind an influence" that was "never eradicated" (Terman, 1950b). Many ventures 
spun off from Federal Telegraph. For example, Terman said, Charles Litton's 
specialized glass blowing business began there. Jensen, who came to the United 
States to help develop the Poulsen Arc at Federal Telegraph, invented the 
dynamic loud speaker with Proud',am. Jensen later left Magnavox, the company 
formed to produce the speaker, and organized the Jensen Company. Magnavox 
and Jensen "were originally local companies, locally financed," Terman stressed 
with some regret that they did not remain so (Terman, 1951a). 
Another legacy of Federal Telegraph was a warning about mixing science 
and finance. "Unfortunately the Federal Telegraph Company and also some of 
our other earlier operations in this area were too much run by bankers and 
the financial people, whose interests were in the stock market rather than 
in creating a productive and sound company," Terman said in a 1951 speech to 
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the Institute of Radio Engineers in Palo Alto (Terman, 1951a). 
Terman wanted to perpetuate these cautionary memories even though he 
considered the postwar group of West Coast electronics firms less susceptible 
to the problems that struck Federal Telegraph. In 1949, when he addressed 
the West Coast Electronics Manufacturers Association, Terman expressed his 
confidence in the staying power of Western electronics companies. Yet in 
doing so he evoked the negative memory: These firms were "sounder, more 
indigenous, better operated and financed" than Federal Telegraph, he said. 
Terman praised the local companies "built up and .. financed from [their] 
own success" (Terman, 1949d). In his 1951 speech to the Institute of Radio 
Engineers in Palo Alto, Terman said that the community now had a group of 
"outstanding" companies of "moderate" size, "run with an idea of representing 
lifetime careers and not with the thought of making a quick profit in the 
stock market, or of blowing it up and selling out to somebody for as much as 
you can, and then letting him hold a bag" (Terman, 1951a). 
Even when he spoke to financial organizations Terman argued that the 
concern with short-term profits tended to thwart scientific companies' goals. 
"Electronics is an industry that has seen more than its share of charlatans, 
and more than its share of promoters interested more in selling and manipulating 
stock than in building a sound enterprise," Terman told those attending the 
American Bankers Association's Pacific Coast Trust Conference in 1947. He 
spoke less harshly of the potential dangers of financiers' influence in this 
setting, but he included gory details of Federal Telegraph's history. The 
company's president "committed suicide only minutes before Federal officials 
broke into his room," Terman said. Later, the officer in control at the 
final receivership hearing testified "that he then had negligible holdings, 
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but had made over $15,000,000 profit in dealings in the stock of the concern, 
which probably never had much over $1,000,000 in actual physical assets" 
(Terman, 1947b). 
At least one manager in American Trust Company, then one of California's 
three largest banks (Wendt, 1946, p. 91) thought that institutional investors 
could deal with emerging technologies. Francis Whitmer, an assistant vice 
president in the bank's trust department who served on the ABA trust conference 
program committee, invited Terman to speak. Whitmer had heard about Terman's 
wartime research from Hugh Jackson, dean of Stanford's business school, and 
believed that the conference audience would be interested in hearing Terman's 
ideas about "the impact of technological developments upon the long term 
economic interests of the country." "As you know from our business, we are 
professional trustees, and as such make investments in many enterprises," 
Whitmer wrote. "The developments of atomic energy and in the electronics 
field have been of great interest to all of us." A speech by Terman would 
fit the committee's goal of bringing "the latest and most informative discussion 
in the various fields we intend to cover." However, Whitmer must have taken 
the initiative to see that technology was one of these fields. There were 
no related speeches, and Terman's was sandwiched between one on "Trusts--
Their Economic Value" and another on "Costs and Charges" (Whitmer, 1947). 
Terman felt a sense of loss that Eastern companies had dominated the 
early stages of the electronics industry's growth, when there had been prospects 
for much of that growth to occur in the West. If Federal Telegraph had been 
"properly managed," it "would logically occupy the place of the Radio 
Corporation of America," he suggested at the trust conference in 1947. 
Part of Terman's solution was for the West Coast community of technology 
companies to become more competitive by supporting research. "A national 
program of research is not only needed by the country as a whole, but the 
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West must have its own special program if it is to realize its full industrial 
possibilities," Terman told the trust officers. "A parasitic industrial 
activity that depends upon imported plans, and second-hand ideas, cannot 
hope to be more than a vassal paying tribute to its host, and condemned to a 
permanently inferior competitive position" (Terman, 1947b). 
At least partly due to Terman's efforts, the West Coast electronics 
industry exploited its postwar opportunity to advance relative to the Eastern 
industry. By 1950, Terman could observe, "West Coast electronics is growing 
faster than the West, and that is saying a lot." East Coast electronics firms 
had been dominant during World War II because General Electric, RCA, the 
government laboratories, MIT, and Harvard "were supplying the hard core of 
scientific support," Terman reflected. After the war, the West "gained 
enormously, and we hold our own with anyone" (Terman, 1950b). 
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